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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The paper shows how a new type of financial derivativeanaccumu-
lated pension collarcan be used to guarantee thatan investment-based
Social Security program provides at least the level of realretirement
income projected under current Social Security rules. In effect, future
retirees purchase a series of put options which guarantee that retirement
benefits do not fall below a benchmark. Theypay for this insurance by
giving up the part of the variable retirement income which exceedsa
certain level, effectively selling a series of call options. We price the
accumulated pension collar via Monte Carlo simulations using the risk
neutral valuation technique.
Martin Feldstein is professor of economics at Harvard University and president ofthe
National Bureau of Economic Research. Elena Ranguelova isa Ph.D. candidate at Harvard
University and a research assistant at the NBER. We are grateful to John Campbell,Zvi
Bodie, George Chacko, Robert Merton, and Kent Smetters for helpfuldiscussions, to
Andrew Samwick for useful comments as well as for his continued participationin provid-
ing the basic nonstochastic simulations, and to Fred Edenius for help withprogramming.150Feldstein & Ranguelovci
Assuming that two thirds of the benchmark isprovided by the tradi-
tional pay-as-you-go program, we find that by savingadditional 2.5
percent of earnings retirees can obtain thebenchmark. Raising the sav-
ings rate to 3 percent of earnings increasessubstantially the income that
individuals can keep, raising it to 145 percent of thecurrently projected
level of benefits.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper shows how a new type of derivativeproduct that could be
provided by private financial markets could in principle beused to guar-
antee that an investment-based socialsecurity reform provides at least
the level of real retirement income that isprojected in current social
security rules. In effect, future retirees couldpurchase a put option that
guarantees that the future retirement benefitwifi not fall below the level
projected in current social security law or some otherchosen level. To
pay for this guarantee, theywould agree to give up the part of the
annuity payments which exceeds a given level,effectively selling a call
option on the stream of payments.
This market-based approach could be completelyvoluntary, leaving
each individual to decide what level of guaranteehe wants. The higher
the minimum guarantee that the individual chooses,the more of the
potentially higher returns he must give up. Thefinancial market can
thus tailor each individual's product to his own riskpreferences. Alterna-
tively, the government might require that any productthat is sold as part
of the investment-based social security reform mustinclude at least
some such market-based guarantee.
Our analysis calculates some of the trade-offs thatcould be provided in
today's financial markets. We show that it is feasible to protectfuture bene-
fits equal to those projected in current law with acombination of the cur-
rent payroll tax rate and personal retirement account(PRA) savings equal
to 2.5 percent of covered earnings. Raisingthe savings rate to 3.0 percent
increase substantially the amount of the returnthat the individual can
keep, raising it to 145 percent of the currentlyprojected level of benefits.
Reducing the guarantee level to 90 percent of theprojected future benefits
would increase this upside potential to 150 percent of thecurrently pro-
jected level of benefits with a 2.5-percent saving rate,and 195 percent of
the currently projected benefits with a 3.0-percent saving rate.
The present analysis thus extends several earlier studiesthat showed
how adding investment-based PRAs to traditional pay-as-you-gosocial
security could in principle maintain the futurebenefits projected in cur-
rent law without the sharp rise in tax ratesthat would otherwise beAccumulated Pension Collars151
necessary if the current pay-as-you-go system remains unchanged (Feld-
stein and Samwick, 1997, 1998a, 1998b). Those studies assumed thatthe
funds in the PRAs earned a real rate of return of5.5 percent, net of
administrative costs. Although 5.5 percent isa conservative assumption
in comparison with the returns earned historicallyon a balanced portfo-
lio of stocks and bonds, these earlier studies didnot deal directly with
the fact that future stock and bond returnsare uncertain.
The issue of uncertainty in PRA returnswas considered explicitly in
Feldstein and Ranguelova (1998) and Feldstein, Ranguelova,and Sam-
wick (1999). Those papers used the historical volatility of stockand bond
returns to characterize the uncertainty of future returns, but didnot
explore the possibility of a market-based method of reducingthe risk to
future retirees. More specifically, during the 50years from 1945 to 1995 a
portfolio consisting of 60 percent stock (measured by the S&P500) and
40 percent corporate bonds had a realmean logarithmic return of 5.9
percent and a standard deviation of 12.5 percent. We subtracted 40 basis
points for administrative costs and used the remainingreturn to gener-
ate PRA assets and annuities for an individual who depositsa constant
percentage of his payroll earnings in his account eachyear from age 21
until retirement at age 67.
Our procedure recognized that the futuremean return is itself uncer-
tain and that, given an estimatedmean return, there is annual variation
in the actual returns. We therefore beganour simulation by drawing a
potential future mean return froma distribution with a mean of 5.5
percent and a standard deviation of 0.0175 (i.e., the 50-yearsample
standard deviation divided by thesquare root of that sample size). We
then randomly generated 80 annual rates of return (forages 21 to 100)
from a distribution with this mean anda standard deviation of 12.5
percent. We used these estimated returns to simulate theaccumulation
of the PRA assets and the subsequent annualpayments of a variable life
annuity. We repeated this process 10,000 times and tabulatedthe result-
ing distributions of annual retirement annuities.
On the basis of these tabulated probability distributionsof the annual
annuities, we concluded that the risk to potential retirees wouldbe
small. For example, in a mixed system in which (1) thepay-as-you-go tax
pays two-thirds of the benefits projected in current law1 and (2) individu-
als save 2 percent of their covered earnings ina PRA that is invested in
the standard 60: 40 stock-bond mix,a 67-year-old retiree would have an
83-percent chance of receiving at least the benchmark level of benefits,i.e.
The current 12.4-percent payroll tax rate would be capable of payingtwo-thirds of the
future benefits projected in current law.152Feldstein & Ranguelova
the level of benefits projected in current law(from the combination of
traditional social security and the PRAannuities) and a 93-percent
chance of getting at least 90 percentof the benchmark level.2
Our analysis also examined the possibilityof providing a government
guarantee that the combination of thetraditional pay-as-you-go benefits
and the PRA annuities would not be less thanthe benchmark level of
benefits. We showed that future taxpayers would assumerelatively little
risk if they provided such a complete guarantee toconcurrent retirees.3
The current paper presents an alternativeapproach to dealing with the
risk inherent in PRA annuities. Thisapproach can completely eliminate
the risk to future retirees and future taxpayers, orit can be used to
modify that risk. The key to this risk mitigation strategyis the use of a
new kind of financialderivative specifically designed to deal withthis
type of annuity risk. As we notedabove, future retirees purchase guaran-
tees that their combined benefitswifi not be less than the benchmark
level (i.e., the benefit level projected in currentsocial security law) or
some other level that theyprefer, and pay for these guarantees by giving
up some part of the returnabove a certain higher level. If there is no
return above this higher level, the retiree paysnothing.
In the language of financial derivatives,the future retiree buys a put
option and finances it by selling a calloption. Such a combination is re-
ferred to as a collar. Collars are a common typeof transaction in many
asset markets. Some life insurancecompanies sell annuity collars in
which individuals purchase a variable annuity(i.e., an annuity whose
payoff depends on the level of an indexof stock prices or of stock and
bond prices) that contains a guaranteed minimumpayment, which is
financed by forgoing some portion of the returnabove that level or some
higher level.4
2These percentages can be derived from the distributionshown in Table 1 of Feldstein and
Ranguelova (1999) by noting that the variable annuity amountscorresponding to a saving
rate of 2 percent are half of the amounts shownin the table for the 4-percent saving rate
and by adding these PRA annuities to thetraditional tax-financed annuity equal to two-
thirds of the future benchmark benefit (i.e., the benefitprojected in current law).
More specifically, we showed that taxpayers wouldhave only about a 50-percent chance
of having to provide any guarantee payments andthat even in the worst 1 percent of cases
the guarantee payments plus the PRA savings paymentsand the 12.4-percent payroll tax
would be less than the approximately 19-percent payroll taxthat would be needed with the
unreformed pay-as-you-go system to provide the samelevel of benefits. This way of
describing the risk may understate its magnitude,because of the possibility of very large
low-probability losses; see Smetters (1999a) for a strong assertionof that view.
' See Bodie (1999) for a brief description of someof the existing annuity collars and for a
more general discussion of thepossible application of collars to social security.Although
Bodie develops this theme, he does not present anyestimates of the types of collars that
would be appropriate for individuals who are accumulatingPRAs. Smetters (1999b) dis-Accumulated Pension Collars153
Such annuity collars are however muchnarrower in scope than the
collars required in an investment-based socialsecurity program. They
assume a single cash premium to purchase the annuity anda payout
during a fixed period ofyears. The guaranteed payout is a nominal
amount of dollars, rather than a real amount. Incontrast, the put associ-
ated with a PRA must guaranteea real benefit from age 67 until the
individual dies. A useful collar fora PRA must also recognize that the
retirement annuity is "purchased" by depositsto saving accounts over
an entire working life. The prices at which the stocks and bondscan be
purchased during these years is unknown whenthe PRA accumulation
begins. This uncertain stream of purchaseprices has to be taken into
account in valuing the cost of the put and the value ofthe associated call.
To distinguish this derivative-pricing problemfrom the problem of pric-
ing a traditional single-premium collar,we refer to this as an accumulated
pension collar.
Section 2 of this paper discusses the theory ofevaluating such an
accumulated pension collar, i.e., of calculatingthe amount of potential
gain that must be given up in order to financethe put option, and
presents results for one basic case. In this basiccase, the retiree is guaran-
teed 100 percent of the benchmark retirementincome (i.e., the amount
of social security benefits projected incurrent law) and gives up 100
percent of the PRA annuity above some critical value. We findthe single
critical value for all years that is consistentwith the market price of risk
inherent in BlackScholes calculations. Section3 then presents a variety
of different collar combinations correspondingto different guarantee
levels, saving rates, and assumptions about therisk-free rate of return. It
also considers a different type of collar in whichthe individual keeps 100
percent of the annuity payment abovea guarantee level (expressed as a
multiple of the benchmark benefit level)up to some critical value and
then keeps 50 percent above that level. Section4 discusses some of the
directions for future work that could extend thispaper.
2. EVALUATING ACCUMULATED
PENSION COLLARS
Before presenting the general framework needed forcalculating the pen-
sion collar for a PRA plan, it is useful to beginwith the much simpler
case of an individual who makes a single investment ina portfolio of
stocks and bonds and wifi later receivea single payment. To be specific,
cusses the use of options to evaluate a social security frust fund invested inequities, but does not deal with individual accounts.154Feldstein & Ranguelova
consider someone of age 45 who deposits$1,000 in an account that is
invested in a portfolio consisting of 60 percentstocks (the S&P 500) and
40 percent corporate bonds. Thehistorical mean real logarithmic return
on such a portfolio, netof an assumed 0.4-percent annual management
charge, is 5.5 percent, and thestandard deviation is 12.5 percent. The
account wifi pay out its value to himin a single payment at age 65, i.e.,
after 20 years. The expected valueof the payout is $3,510 in constant
dollars at the initial price level (i.e., inthe prices of the year when the
individual was 45 years old.)5
There is however substantial uncertaintyabout the value to which the
account wifi grow during the 20 years.Although the mean level return is
6.27 percent,6 the actual return canbe significantly below or above this
level. If the individual wants to avoidthe uncertainty completely, he can
instead invest the initial $1,000 in a 20-yearTreasury inflation-protected
bond that has a real yield of 4.0percent.7 This wifi provide a real payment
at age 65 of $2,191. Therewill be no risk of something less and no chanceof
getting something higher. By purchasing acollar, the individual can give
up some of the sure return(accepting a guarantee level that is belowthe
$2,191) but in exchange has some chanceof getting a higher return.
More specifically, the individual can investin the stock-bond portfolio
but then buy a put option with astrike price of $2,000 that guarantees
that his payout wifi be at least$2,000. Such an option wifi pay him
nothing if the stock-bond investment pays$2,000 or more, but will pay
him the difference between $2,000and the actual payout of the invest-
ment if that turns out to be lessthan $2,000. The cost of that put option,
which can be calculated using theBlack-Scholes option-pricing model,
depends only on the initial investment(the $1,000), the volatility of the
return (the standard deviationof 12.5 percent), the length of time from
the investment to the payout (20years), and the risk-free rate of return.
We take this risk-free rate of return tobe the 4-percent return on the
TIPS. Taken together, these parametersimply that the cost of the put
option, paid in the initial year,wifi be$i62.
One way to pay for such a put is tosell a call option on the investment
return. A call option with strikeprice Z would require the individual to
The combination of the mean logarithmic rateof return and the standard deviation
implies that the expected annual rate of returnis exp[0.0S5 + 0.5(0.125)21 1 = 0.0648.
6See footnote 5.
With these Treasury inflation-protected securities(TIPS), the principal and the interest
payments are adjusted for changes in theConsumer Price Index. There is the reinvestment
risk that the interest payments might not bereinvestable along the way at a 4-percent real
return. But since the yield curve for TIPS isquite flat, such a real "stripped" bond could be
created that provided a pure cumulative real returnof about 4 percent.Accumulated Pension Collars155
pay to the buyer of the call the difference between the payout of the
investment and Z dollars. The higher the strike price, the lessthe call is
worth. We can again use the BlackScholes option-pricingmodel to find
the value of Z that makes the price of the calloption equal to the$162
value of the put option with a$2,000strike price.
The collar is thus defined by the two strike prices: thestrike price of
the put that the individual selects to protect his minimumpayout($2,000
in this example) and the strike price of the call(Z = $2,611)that the
individual must sell to pay for this put.
The problem of guaranteeing a minimum retirementincome in a sys-
tem that mixes a PRA annuity and the traditional social securitybenefits
is a generalization of this simple single-premium andsingle-payout col-
lar. Any PRA system would phase in gradually, withindividuals who
retire after the first 10 years having relatively small PRAannuities and a
greater dependence on the traditional pay-as-you-go social securitybene-
fits. We focus in this paper on the long-run situationwhen the tax-
financed benefits pay two-thirds of the benefits projectedin current law,
i.e., two-thirds of what we wifi refer toas the benchmark benefits.8 We
take this two-thirds as available without risk (even thoughthere is al-
ways a political risk associated with pay-as-you-go benefits9). We begin
by investigating the use of a collar to guarantee that thecombination of
the PRA annuity and the traditional benefits isat least equal to the
benchmark benefit'° specified for each futureyear by the social security
actuaries for an individual with mean covered earningsin each year.
Equivalently, we investigate the use ofa collar to guarantee that the PRA
annuity is at least equal to one-third of the benchmark benefitin each
retirement year.
Our analysis is based on the demographic andeconomic projections of
the social security actuaries. Although the unit of analysisin our cal-
culations is the individual worker and retiree,our calculations are scaled
to take into account benefits for spouses, dependents, andsurviving
8This two-thirds reflects the fact that the social security actuaries predictthat the cost of
paying the projected benefits wifi eventually be equivalent toa payroll-tax rate of 19
percent. The available 12.4-percent payroll-tax revenue is two-thirds of this projectedcost.
Feldstein and Samwick (2000) show how thepay-as-you-go system plus the incremental
tax revenue that results from the PRA accounts can finance benefits equalto those pro-
jected in current law with the pay-as-you-go tax unchangedat 12.4 percent even if 2.0
percentage points of this tax is used to finance PRA deposits.
See McHale (1999) for a discussion of benefit reduction in key OECDcountries as well as
in the United States.
10Our analysis does not deal with the issue of bequests. See Feldstein andRanguelova
(1999) and Brown (1999) for discussions of pre-retirement andpost-retirement bequests.156Feldstein & Ranguelova
beneficiaries. The calculations also implicitlyprovide funds for the dis-
ability insurance program. For more details onthis, see Feldstein and
Samwick (1998a, 1998b).
We assume that individuals pay 2.5 percentof their covered earnings
into a personal retirement accountthat is invested in the mix of stocks
and bonds described above. When theindividual reaches age 67, the
accumulated sum is converted into a variableannuity that is invested in
the same assets. We use a 2.5-percentsaving rate instead of the 2.0
percent that was the principal assumptionin previous studies, because
the resulting benefits must now beused to purchase risk protection.
In the previous studies, either there was norisk protection or the future
taxpayers had to provide transferswhen benefits fell below the bench-
mark level. The cost of such intergenerationaltransfers is avoided in the
current analysis by relying on voluntarymarket transactions.11
Consider the problem of guaranteeing that thecombined benefit from
the traditional social security programplus the PRA annuities is at least
as large as thebenchmark benefit in each year of retirement. Since two-
thirds of the benchmark benefits areprovided by the pay-as-you-go
system, this is equivalent to buying aput option for each year's PRA
annuity with a strike price equal toone-third of the benchmark benefit
level. We can then calculate the commonstrike price for a call option for
the same PRA annuity payments that hasthe same market value as the
combined put option.
A closed-form solution does not existfor the value of such a pension
collar based on multiyear investments during anindividual's working
life. Bodie's (1999) discussion of applyingfinancial engineering to social
security applied the traditionalBlack-Scholes pricing method to a much
simpler version of our problem. He studiedthe collar defined only over
the decumulation phase of the retirement program(and with the as-
sumption of a known life expectancy.) Overthat phase, the collar can be
decomposed to a linear combination of putand call options, which in
turn can be valued directly with theBlack-Scholes formula. In our accu-
mulated pension collar, individuals purchasethe derivative contract at
age 21 when they maketheir first contribution to an account.'2 Atthat
time we know how many dollars they wifi beputting into the account in
each year in the future, but we do not knowhow many units of the
11 We analyze the implications of two-percent and three-percent saving ratesin section 3
below.
12 This is a plausible description of behavior only if some form of collar ismandated by law,
requiring the seller of PRA investments to providesuch a guarantee. We return in section 4
to the possibility that in a completelyvoluntary system the individual starts later or
changes the nature of his guarantee level over time.Accumulated Pension Collars157
stockbond portfolio these dollars will buy for them eachyear.13 The
pension collar as of age 21 therefore cannot be decomposedinto a linear
combination of puts and calls and thereforecannot be valued by the
Black-Scholes formula. We need touse a numerical implementation of
an alternative option-pricing technique known as risk-neutral valuation.
This technique, which we describe in the followingparagraph, provides
the same option value as the BlackScholes modelin the cases when
both can be applied. The theoretical justification forit was first devel-
oped by Cox and Ross (1976).
A fundamental property of option prices is that theyare independent of
the expected return on the underlying security. Thederivation of the
option-pricing formula relies on a single "no arbitrage"condition and
makes no assumptions about individual preferences (Blackand Scholes,
1973). Because of the preference-free property, thesame price of an option
is valid with any kind of preferences, including risk-neutralones. This sim-
plifies the valuation problem enormously, becausewe can shift our calcu-
lation to a risk-neutral world and find the value of theoption as a present
value of its future payoffs discounted at the riskiessrate. In order to do
that, we must modify the average returnon all risky assets to be equal to
the riskless rate14 and then discount payoffsat the same risk-free rate.'5
Stated somewhat differently, to calculate optionvalues we maintain the
true variability of the payoffs (the same variance of thereturns per unit
time) but shift the mean return to the risk-freerate of return. We further
reduce the return by 40 basis points to allow foradministrative costs.
In our particular case, the price ofa put option at age 21 on the annuity
payment due at age 67 would be
P,,(67) =seS?_hl)E*[max{B- a(67),0}}, (2.1)
where IT67 is the proportion of 21-year-olds who willreach age 67,16 E*
signifies that the expectation is takenover the risk-neutralized distribu-
Our analysis assumes that the future path of each individual'searnings is known and
that the only uncertainty is about the portfolio returns. Wereturn to the issue of uncertain
future labor income in section 4.
14 The intuition here is that whenwe make calculations for a risk-neutral world, we must
assume that preferences reflect risk-neutral probabilities. In sucha world, all assets, no
matter how volatile, have expected returns equal to the risk-free rate ofreturn.
15 The risk-neutral valuation approachto option pricing was first developed by Cox and
Ross (1976). For further discussions, see Ingersoll (1987) andMerton (1990).
16 We assume that the future mortalityrates are known and introduce no additional risk to
sellers of put options and buyers of call options. Although there isin fact some uncertainty
about these mortality rates, it is small relative to the market riskand could be insured
separately from the investment risk at very low cost.158Feldstein & Ranguelova
tion of asset returns,17 B is thebenchmark level of benefits to be pro-
tected by the put, a(t) is the annuity payment(including the riskiess
portion equal to two-thirds of B that isprovided by the tax-financed pay-
as-you-go system), and r isthe risk-free interest rate. The cost tothe
individual of all his put options would then bethe actuarial sum
P = rte_r(t_hl)E*[max{B - a(t),0}] (2.2)
t67,..,100
whereis the proportion of the initial21-year-olds who wifi survive to
age t.18
To evaluate (2.1) and (2.2), we sample10,000 times from the distribu-
tion of asset returns. In order to improvethe efficiency of the simulated
estimators in this process, we generate theinitial 10,000 standard nor-
mals by generating 5,000 and combining themwith their mirror image.
Given the value of the series of put options inequation (2.2), we search
for the call strike price (CAP) which impliesthe same total value for the
series of calls. For the distribution ofpayoffs a(67) at age 67, the value at
age 21 of the call option withstrike price CAP (i.e., the market value of
the call option that pays the buyer of thecall everything in excess of the
level CAP) is
C67 = E[max{a(67) - CAP,0}] (2.3)
where E* again indicates that the expectationis taken over the risk-
neutralized distribution of asset returns.
The market value at age 21 of a call optionwith a common strike price
CAP for all ages is therefore
C = r1e_r(t_hl)E*[max{a(t) - CAP, 0}}. (2.4)
t=67.....100
Risk-neutralized in this context means that the distributionof the annuity payments is
generated as we did before but with the mean returnreduced to the real return on the risk-
free assets, r = 0.04. In practice, taking the administrativecost into account, this means a
rate of 0.036, corresponding to the risk-freerate of 0.04. This is equivalent to using a 4-
percent rate while assuming an administrativecharge equal to 0.40 percent of assets. In an
earlier version of this paper, presented at the August2000 NBER Summer Institute, we
used the 4-percent risk-free rate without adjustmentfor administrative cost.
18 The benefits projected for each individual in social security law remainconstant in real
value throughout the retiree's life. It is not necessarytherefore to distinguish between B
values by age.By equating the values of the put option ofequation (2.2) and the call
option of equation (2.4) we can solve for thestrike price CAP that is





When we implement this numerically, followingCampbell, Lo, and
MacKinley (1997), we find that thecommon strike price on the call op-
tion corresponding to the 2.5-percent savingrate is 116 percent of the
benchmark benefit: CAP= 1.16B.
These calculations imply thatan individual with average earnings
who deposits 2.5 percent of those earnings ina PRA invested in a 60 : 40
stock-bond portfolio can use that accountto acquire a collar at no addi-
tional cost that guarantees that the combinedbenefit (from the PRA
annuity and the traditional social securitypayments) will be at least 100
percent of the benchmark benefit specified incurrent law and can go up
to 116 percent of that benchmark. More succinctly,the mixed system
with a 12.4-percent tax anda 2.5-percent PRA saving rate can guarantee
the benefits projected in current law and allowthe individual to receive
up to 116 percent of those benefits.
Figure 1 shows the way that this collar wouldwork. The curved line,
in the upper panel, shows the cumulativedistribution of the PRA pay-
ment at age 67. Of the 10,000 simulations, thereare approximately 5,200
in which the PRA payment atage 67 would be less than the benchmark
level of benefits (denoted by the solid lineat 1). The put would raise
these payouts to the benchmark level. Thereare then approximately
2,600 simulations out of the 10,000 for whichthe payout is above the
benchmark but below the cap at 1.16 times thebenchmark (shown by the
higher line). In these cases, the individualwould receive the actual
payout, an amount greater than the benchmark. Inabout 2,200 cases the
payout would exceed 1.16 times the benchmark,shown by the curve
above the higher line. In thesecases, the individual would receive 1.16
times the benchmark, and the seller of thecollar would receive the
excess. The net effect of this is shown in the lower panel ofFigure 1,
which presents the amount received by theindividual at age 67 as a
multiple of the benchmark: an amount equalto the benchmark with
probability 0.52 and an amount greater thanthe benchmark with proba-
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ual receives is 0.52, and the probabilitythat the cap limits the amount
that the individual receives is onlyabout 0.22.
There are of course other possibletrade-offs that the individual might
prefer. In particular, the individual canchoose to have higher possible
benefits by accepting a lower guaranteelevel, saving at a higher rate, or
forgoing a share of all PRA payoutsin excess of the amount needed to
achieve the benchmark level. We nowexplore some of these possibilities.
3. EFFECTS OF THESAVING RATE AND GUARANTEE
LEVEL ON THE CALL-OPTIONSTRIKE PRICE
A higher PRA saving rate reducesthe risk that the PRA benefits wififall
below the benchmark level. As aresult, the higher PRA saving rate can
substantially increase the maximum amountof the annuity income that
the individual can keep, i.e., thecall-option strike price. The higher
saving rate also raises the meanlevel of PRA benefits that theindividual
keeps for any given call-option strikeprice.Accumulated Pension Collars161
TABLE 1
Effects of Saving Rates and Guarantee Levels on Call Option
Strike Prices
(a) These guarantee levels cannot be supported with the specified saving rate.
An alternative way that an individual can retain more of the retire-
ment income (i.e., receive a higher call-option strike price) is to accept a
lower put-option strike price (i.e., a lower guarantee level.) Table 1
shows the call-option strike prices corresponding to three differentsav-
ing rates (2.0, 2.5, and 3.0 percent of the covered earnings) and four
levels of guarantees (90, 95, 100, and 105 percent of the benchmark.)
Reducing slightly the level of the guarantee substantially increases the
maximum amount that the individual retiree can keep, i.e., the level of
the cap. Thus with a 2.5-percent saving rate, the cap rises from 116
percent of the benchmark with a 100-percent guarantee floor to 150
percent with a 90-percent floor. Raising the guarantee level to 106 per-
cent of the benchmark requires a call option with the same 106-percent
strike price; stated differently, investing in a 4-percent risk-freegovern-
ment bond yields 106 percent of the benchmark.
Raising the saving rate also has a substantial effect on the maximum
amount that the retirees can keep. With a 100-percent floor, the cap rises
from 116 percent of the benchmark with a 2.5-percent saving rate to 145
percent with a 3-percent saving rate. A 2-percent saving rate is not
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fit equal to the benchmark. To achieve that benchmark guarantee re-
quires a saving rate of 2.16 percent or more.
There are of course a variety of other ways in which guaranteesand
caps can be combined. Onesuch variation that allows greater upside
gain is to share all of the gain above some thresholdlevel. For example,
the individual could obtain a put option that guaranteesthat the benefit
is at least equal to the benchmark and in exchange give acall option that
gives the holder of the call 50 percent of the annuity paymentin excess
of some threshold level. With a saving rate of 3.0 percent,this 50-percent
sharing rule would allow the individual to keep 100 percentof the annu-
ity up to 119 percent of the benchmark and then 50 percentof the excess
above that level with no limit.
These calculations have all assumed a real risk-free interest rateof 4.0
percent, reduced by 40 basis points for administrative costs.A lower rate
of return increases the cost of the put option and requires alower cap for
the equal-valued call option. With a saving rate of 2.5 percentand guar-
antee level of 100 percent of the benchmarkbenefit, the cap declines
from 116 percent of the benchmark with a 4-percent real rateof return to
106 percent with a 3.75-percent real rate of return and to 98 percentwith
a 3.5-percent real rate of return.With a saving rate of 2.0 percent and a
real return of 3.5 percent, the collar is just sufficient toprovide the
guarantee at a level of about 92 percent of the benchmarkbenefit.
4. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This paper shows how market-based accumulated pensioncollars can be
used to reduce the risk of investment-based social securityreforms.
These pension collars finance a put-option guarantee at a chosenlevel of
retirement income by selling a call option that limits or reduceshigher
levels of retirement annuities.
We have shown how to calculate some of the ways that anindividual
can guarantee that the combination of thetraditional social security bene-
fits and the PRA annuities wifi be at least equal to the benefitsprojected
in the current social security law. Such a guarantee can beachieved with
a saving rate as low as 2.16 percentof earnings. Higher saving rates or
lower guarantee levels would permit individuals to have thepossibility
of receiving substantially higher levels of annuity payout.
The current analysis raises several issues for future research. Wehave,
for example, assumed that all future annual earnings during theindivid-
ual's working life are known at age 21 and therefore that the futurePRA
contributions are also known. How might the option design bemodified
to reflect the uncertainty of future earnings, andhow would that uncer-Accumulated Pension Collars163
tainty affect the option pricing? This is complicated by theextent to which
an individual can control those earnings by his or her personal decisions.
A related issue is raised by the assumption inour analysis that individu-
als commit to a particular guarantee level at the start of their workinglife
and choose at that time the investment mix (e.g., the 60: 40 stockbond
portfolio) for life. In reality, some individuals will want to change bothof
these over time, perhaps in response to the cumulative performanceof
their investments. Options have a value along the time patheven before
retirement begins that would allow such changes to be made. Individuals
might also select a collar based on some standard market portfoliowhile
actually investing their funds in varying ways.19 An explicit analysisof
this issue would be desirable.
The social security rules promise a benefit that maintains its realvalue
(as measured by the Consumer Price Index) after the individualretires.
The put and call options that we have pricedare based on those real
benefit levels. Although the existing Treasury inflation-indexedbonds
provide a natural way of hedging such risk, they havea relatively low
rate of return. An interesting question is what role such securities might
play in an optimal hedging strategy, perhaps witha yield enhanced by
the use of credit derivatives that raise the expectedreturn by reducing
the credit quality below that of the government bonds.
There are of course administrative issues and fiduciaryquestions
about what kinds of firms might be allowed to sell pension collars,what
their reserves would have to be, etc. Such issuesare dealt with today for
annuity and insurance products by a variety of government regulatory
agencies.
The large-scale use of pension collars might change the marketprice of
risk, i.e., the prices of securities and the real interestrate. Although it
would be interesting to explore general equilibrium modelsto see what
light they can shed on possible changes in the price of riskas the de-
mand for such pension collars grows, it is worth keepingin mind that
the market in derivatives has grown explosivelyover the past decade
and may be expected to do so in the future ifa new demands for such
products develops.20
Finally, the analysis should be extended to allow for bequestswhen
individuals die before reaching retirementage and for the possibility of
19 The payoffs of the put and call would then reflect thehypothetical portfolio correspond-
ing to the standard market portfolio, with the individual taking the risksassociated with
the differences between that standard portfolio and the particular portfolio that hehas
chosen.
20 The volume of outstanding over-the-counterderivatives rose from less than $5 trillion at
the end of 1990 to nearly $60 trillion at the end of 1999.164Feldstein & Ranguelova
bequests even for those who die after the annuityhas begun. Although
we have examined thosepossibilities in an earlier paper, that analysis
did not include the use of options. When options areincluded, there are
questions about how the call-option payoffsmight be designed when
individuals die before retirement and what kinds of guarantees,if any,
might be sought for the size of bequest whenindividuals die before
retirement (Feldstein and Ranguelova, 1999).
One of the advantages of a market-based systemfor dealing with risk
is that it would allow individuals to selectcombinations that reflect their
preferences. This individual discretion might becombined with a govern-
ment requirement that any eligiblePRA plan provide a guarantee of at
least (say) 90 percent of the benchmark benefitbut, subject to that re-
quirement, individuals could be free to selectwhatever strategy of puts
and calls they like. There is clearly great scopefor the imaginative design
of alternative ways of protecting retirement incomes.
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